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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
may properly question whether this criticism is expressive of repugnance
for the "improper" role of the Court, or of the "humanitarianism" of its
decisions.
In any event, the Court has met the problem of legislation which
could have been interpreted to defeat a humanitarian doctrine. It has
refused to give literal interpretation to the statute to the exclusion of the
humanitarian doctrine. This classic example of collision between doc-
trine and statute has been resolved in favor of contemporary attitudes
toward industrial injuries. The humanitarian doctrine has been vindi-
cated.
EUGENE SIDNEY BAYER
Evidence of Criminal History in Ohio
Criminal Prosecutions
Place a man's bad record before the jury and it is almost impossible
for them to take an impartial view of the case brought against him.
Slight evidence becomes magnified. Every defense is liable to appear
suspicious.,
Courts2 and legal writers3 have traditionally seized upon the above
proposition to justify excluding evidence of a defendant's criminal his-
tory in a criminal prosecution.4 However, this exclusionary rule is based
on policy rather than logic. Evidence which tends to prove the proposi-
tion for which it is introduced is logically relevant. Since trial is a means
by which truth is sought, all evidence that serves to aid the triers of fact
in arriving at the truth is logically relevant.' In this respect, evidence of
a person's criminal history is relevant in that it tends to demonstrate habit
or disposition to commit crime. Nevertheless, the chance of prejudice
to the defendant from an "over-strong" tendency of a jury to believe him
1. Regina v. Farris, [1841] 1 Q.B. 129, 131.
2. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y.
264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
3. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE 157 (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK f]; 1
WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 232-48 (12th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as 1 WHAR-
TON f]; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §5 192-94 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 1 WIGMORE
0].
For a discussion of the use of criminal history evidence, see generally Lacy, Admissibil-
ity of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REV. 267 (1952);
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988
(1938); Thomas, Looking Logically at Evidence of Other Crimes In Oklahoma, 15 OKLA. L.
REV. 431 (1962).
4. A defendant's criminal history may include evidence showing prior convictions, indict-
ments, arrests, police or private suspicions, and investigations or other unpunished offenses.
5. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 (1904).
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guilty of the crime charged, merely because of his propensity to commit
crime, outweighs the logical relevancy of criminal history evidence.6
Notwithstanding the general policy, it has been held that criminal
history evidence may be admitted if it is legally, as well as logically rel-
evant. That is, if the state can demonstrate that a defendant's criminal
history is relevant for an "additional purpose," other than to show dis-
position to commit crime, it may be admitted. Such evidence has an
"additional purpose" when used (1) to impeach the defendant's credi-
bility as a witness when he testifies in his own behalf, (2) to rebut the
defendant's good character when he introduces evidence thereof, and (3)
to substantially prove an element of the crime charged.
This note will illustrate the liberal attitude which the Ohio courts
have adopted in admitting an accused's criminal history as substantive
proof of the crime charged. This attitude can only mean that the courts
are not giving full consideration to the accompanying danger of prejudice
to the defendant or that they no longer feel prejudice is a controlling
ground for exclusion. While the former seems to be true in prosecutions
against non-sexual offenders, the latter is true for sexual offenders!
Particular attention will be directed toward cases involving sex of-
fenders in which the greatest liberalization is found. The result is a com-
plete abandonment of the traditional concept of excluding criminal his-
tory evidence relevant only to show criminal disposition. However, in
order to illustrate the degree of liberalization in prosecutions for both
non-sexual and sexual crimes, attention is first directed to criminal history
evidence as used to impeach credibility and rebut the defendant's good
character.9
IMPEACHING DEFENDANT'S CREDIBILITY
It is a well-established rule that when a defendant testifies in his own
behalf"0 he thereby puts his character for "truth and veracity" into issue,
subjecting himself" to the same test of credibility as any other witness.'"
6. Among other policy reasons listed by courts and writers are: (1) the right of defendant
to be tried only for the crime charged, (2) the right of defendant to be free from surprise
and to prepare a defense only for the crime charged, (3) that the evidence of criminal history
confuses the jury and diverts attention from the real issue, and (4) that the state is not en-
titled to attack defendant's character until he offers evidence of his good character. See gen-
erally 1 JONES, EVIDENCE § 162 (5th ed. 1958); 1 WHARTON S 232, at 497 (citing author-
ities); 1 WiGMoRg § 194.
7. Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
8. See notes 72-77 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 11 infra.
10. OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.43 provides: "a person charged with an offense may, at
his own request, be a witness, but not otherwise." Thus, the state is prohibited from com-
pelling defendant to testify. See State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202
(1956) (discussing § 2945A3).
11. Defendant also subjects himself to exposure of his criminal history when he offers
character evidence. But until he does so, the prosecution is precluded from attacking his
1964]
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Thus, on cross examination, the prosecutor may attempt to impeach a
defendant's credibility 3 by showing his criminal history. 4
Fortunately, however, most legislatures and courts impose restrictions
on the prosecutor's use of such evidence. In Ohio, for example, the
prosecution may use only a small portion of a defendant's criminal his-
tory, namely, his prior convictions.1" Evidence of prior indictments,16
arrests,'7 and the like are not admissible for such purposes. Moreover,
inquiry as to prior convictions is limited to the number of convictions
sustained and the name and nature of the crime involved. Questions di-
rected at details and incidents of the crime are excluded."
These limitations serve the further purpose of minimizing the ever
present danger of jury prejudice. The theory is that the jury should be
exposed only so long and in such depth as is necessary. But, it is difficult
to understand why the courts adopt such a strict attitude here, yet remain
liberal, as will be demonstrated later in this article, when criminal history
character. However, upon offering character evidence, the defendant denies the policy of the
exclusionary rule, thereby leaving the prosecution free to introduce evidence of his prior con-
viction.
It is questionable whether the jury prejudice stimulated by general character evidence
in favor of the defendant is outweighed by the adverse prejudice created in rebuttal thereof
by the prosecutor. For a discussion of the use of character witnesses see generally Ladd, Tech-
niques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REV. 498 (1939).
12. Ohio has removed the common law disqualification of persons convicted of crimes from
testifying. OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.42. For a list of states abolishing the disqualification
by statute see Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 303 n.1
(1960).
13. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cit. 1941); State v. Rodriguez, 110 Ohio
App. 307, 169 N.E.2d 464 (1959); State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202
(1956).
14. Proving prior convictions is one of five ways to impeach credibility. For a discussion
of the various other methods see Udall, Character Proof in the Law of Evidence - A Sum-
mary, 18 U. CINC. L. REV. 283 (1949).
15. OHIO REV. CODE § 2945.42 provides in part: "Such ... conviction ... may be shown
for the purpose of affecting the credibility of such witness." (Emphasis added.) For a
judicial criticism of the use of prior convictions to impeach see Ashcraft, supra note 12, at 303.
16. People v. Waller, 64 Cal. App. 390, 222 Pac. 171 (1923); Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio
St. 136, 152 N.E. 28 (1926); Keveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141 N.E. 84 (1923); State
v. Barton, 191 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); accord, State v. Spadomi, 137 Wash. 684,
243 Pac. 854 (1926). Contra, Eaves v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 460, 29 S.W.2d 339 (1930)
(evidence of prior charges pending against defendant admitted); Baker v. State, 79 Tex. Crim.
510, 187 S.W. 949 (1916) (evidence of prior indictment admitted).
17. Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922). Ohio courts have consis-
tently held it to be prejudicial error for the prosecution to inquire about prior arrests and
indictments when it has no proof of a conviction for the incident in question. State v. Cole,
107 Ohio App. 444, 155 N.E.2d 507 (1958) (defendant prejudiced by inquiry without
proof of conviction); State v. Kennedy, 72 Ohio App. 462, 52 N.E.2d 873 (1943).
In City of Troy v. Cummins, 107 Ohio App. 318, 322, 159 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1958),
the court stated that the proper way to frame an inquiry into past convictions is as follows:
"Have you been arrested and convicted of a criminal offense?" (Emphasis added.) Accord,
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
18. State v. Hill, 111 Ohio App. 257, 165 N.E.2d 241 (1959); accord, State v. Aldo, 165
Minn. 440, 206 N.W. 933 (1926). For a discussion on depth of inquiry into past convic-
tions see Udall, supra note 14, at 292.
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evidence is used to prove an element of the crime charged. Certainly,
the same danger of prejudice exists in both cases; and if anything, the
danger would be greater in the latter case.
The types of crime for which evidence of prior convictions may be
shown, however, are many. As a general rule, the prosecution can in-
troduce evidence of prior convictions of crimes which are felonies
under either state or federal law. Likewise, it has been held in some
jurisdictions that evidence of prior convictions is admissible if the crime
is a misdemeanor under state law. Thus, in State v. Murdock, 9 the
Ohio Supreme Court defined "crime," as used in section 2945.42 of the
Ohio Revised Code,"0 as including "both misdemeanors and felonies un-
der state law."'" Moreover, one Ohio court has even gone as far as al-
lowing evidence of prior convictions of a municipal ordinance, provided
however, that such ordinance is identical to a state statute.22
It is doubtful whether convictions for simple misdemeanors or felo-
nies not involving a disposition for perjury, cast any doubt on the de-
fendant's character for truth and veracity. The drafters of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence have taken this position by limiting the use of prior
convictions to crimes involving dishonesty or false statements, such as
perjury, bribery, and forgery2
Trial courts generally give instructions to juries to the effect that prior
convictions are to be considered only for impeachment purposes and not
upon the question of guilt or innocence.2 4 However, jurists and text
authorities question a juror's ability to departmentalize evidence according
to its limited purposes; it is thought that, at least subjectively, such evi-
dence is given improper weight in deciding the ultimate question of
guilt.2 5  Furthermore, it is doubtful whether such safeguards as jury in-
structions combined with the restrictions on prosecutors in using prior
convictions, 21are effective in protecting against this bedrock of prejudice.
19. 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961).
20. "No person is disqualified as a witness in a criminal prosecution by reason of his interest
in the event thereof as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of crime.
OHIo REv. CODE § 2945.42. (Emphasis added.)
21. State v. Murdoch, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961) (syllabus).
22. State v. Hamm, 104 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951). Contra, City of Troy v. Cum-
mins, 107 Ohio App. 318, 159 N.E.2d 239 (1958). Because the supreme court has refused
to pass on this question, the lower courts remain split. In State v. Reese, 117 Ohio App. 454,
463, 192 N.E.2d 791, 798 (1962), the court, on motion to reconsider, refused to answer the
question of whether or not a prior conviction under a municipal ordinance identical to a
state statute is admissible. Clearly a conviction under a municipal ordinance not identical to
a state statute is inadmissible. Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 264 (1922).
Other states admit convictions for "any crime" or "any felony," while a few admit infamous
crimes." See MCCORMIcK § 43, at 89-91 & nn. 2-10.
23. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 21.
24. E.g., State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956).
25. Stephens v. State, 252 Ala. 183, 186, 40 So. 2d 90, 93 (1949): Ashcraft, supra note 12,
at 306.
26. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
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CRIMINAL HISTORY EVIDENCE AS SUBSTANTIVE
PROOF OF THE CRIME CHARGED
It has been held that the exclusionary rule relating to admissibility
of criminal history does not prohibit the state from proving its case, par-
ticularly when such evidence is necessary to prove a substantive element
of the crime." Generally, whenever a defendant's criminal history tends
to directly prove his guilt of the crime charged, it will not be excluded
because it also, incidentally, shows his guilt as to other crimes. In this
respect, the Ohio courts admit criminal history evidence when it has a
"natural tendency to establish the particular fact in issue,"28 or "tends to
show the accused's guilt of the crime charged."2 The theory is that crimi-
nal history, in such a case, is independently relevant and, therefore, ad-
missible as substantive evidence.3" Unlike impeaching credibility or re-
butting good character, where defendant alone controls admissibility,
criminal history which tends to prove a substantive element of the crime
charged may be introduced in the prosecution's case-in-chief.3 '
Relevancy - Section 2945.59
Ohio is among the majority of jurisdictions which have adopted well-
defined exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the prosecution from
introducing a defendant's criminal history in its case-in-chief.32 Section
2945.59 of the Ohio Revised Code, commonly called the "similar acts
statute, 33 provides:
27. State v. Frabut, 180 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio
St. 437, 178 N.E.2d 36 (1961); Bandy v. State, 13 Ohio App. 461 (1921), aff'd, 102 Ohio
St. 384, 131 N.E. 499 (1921).
28. Boyd v. State, 81 Ohio St. 239, 243, 90 N.E. 355, 356 (1909).
29. State v. Frabutt, 180 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), appeal dismissed, 172
Ohio St. 437, 178 N.E.2d 90 (1961).
30. The supreme court firmly established relevancy as the test of admissibility in Whiteman
v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928). Some legal writers hold relevancy as the
test. See generally 1 WHARTON § 232; 1 WIGMORE § 27.
31. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 At. 649 (1918), citing People v. Molineux,
168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
32. Ohio and the majority of states follow the so-called "exclusionary rule." The federal
courts and a few states follow the so-called "inclusionary rule," admitting other-crimes evi-
dence in all cases except those in which it is relevant solely to show criminal disposition. The
leading case discussing the "exclusionary rule" is People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 291-94,
61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (1901). For an analysis of both rules see Stone, The Rule of Exclusion
of Similar Facts Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938).
Courts and commentators have urged abandonment of the "exclusionary rule" in favor of
the positively stated "inclusionary rule." State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947);
Lacy, Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REV.
267 (1952). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 311 (1942), adopting the minority rule.
33. This is really a misnomer, since evidence of other crimes wholly different in nature
from the crime charged, has been admitted. State v. White, 116 Ohio App. 522, 189 N.E.2d
160 (1962) (evidence of prior immoral acts in child stealing prosecution); State v. Frabutt,
180 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 437, 178 N.E.2d
90 (1961) (evidence of child molesting in prosecution for bribery).
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In any criminal case in which defendant's motive or intent, the absence
of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or
system in doing an act is material, any acts of defendant which tend
to show his motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his
part, or the defendant's scheme, plan, or system in doing the act in
question may be proved ... notwithstanding that such proof may show
or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant
3 4
This section appears exhaustive on its face. However, an examination
of the cases which have applied it indicates that its exceptions are not ex-
haustive. For example, in State v. Brown, 5 the court sustained the lower
court's holding that other-crimes evidence establishing the "identity" of
the defendant with the crime charged was admissible. The court found
the exceptions listed in section 2945.59 inapplicable, but justified its de-
cision on the ground that the statute is merely declaratory of the common
law, and that "identity" was a recognized exception at common law.
Similarly, in State v. Ross, 6 the court stated that section 2945.59 "may
not be all-inclusive." Hence, in spite of the listed exceptions, it would
seem that the courts look more to whether the evidence is relevant to
prove an element of the crime charged, rather than to "pigeon-holing"
section 2945.59.
Although no definitive formula has been suggested for ascertaining
the relevancy of criminal history evidence, some cases do set out guide-
lines which are frequently used by the courts in deciding this question.
They are: (1) the weight of the evidence in establishing the occurrence
of the other crime and the defendant's connection therewith, (2) the
nature of the crime charged," and (3) the other evidence in possession
of, or available to, the prosecutor to establish a prima fade case.s  Un-
fortunately, too often Ohio courts have lost sight of one or more of these
guidelines. The result: a defendant's criminal history is admissible only
for the purpose of showing his propensity to commit crime.
Acts or Crimes? - Section 2945.59
Unlike using criminal history to impeach credibility or rebut character
evidence, the prosecution is not limited to prior convictions when using
criminal history as substantive proof.4° Since criminal history is relevant
34. Omo REv. CODE § 2945.59.
35. 137 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
36. 92 Ohio App. 29, 37, 108 N.E.2d 77, 82 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 248,
108 N.E.2d 282 (1952). See McCoRMcK § 157 suggesting the exceptions are as broad
as relevancy.
37. E.g., State v. Whigham, 60 Ohio App. 181, 20 N.E.2d 257 (1938).
38. E.g., State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948).
39. E.g., State v. Martin, 191 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
40. The prosecution, however, is prohibited from using prior convictions under section
2945.59. Only the defendant's "acts" may be shown.
1964]
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to prove guilt, the acts of defendant are important, not his convictions.
But this raises the question of whether the acts must constitute a crime
in order to be admissible. Although section 2945.59 speaks in terms of
"acts" rather than "crimes," the court, in State v. Roberts,4 stated:
Acts other than the one charged in the indictment which are admitted
for the purpose of showing ... the ... [crime] charged must be proven
by substantial evidence.42
In spite of this and similar language by other courts," a real danger
exists that evidence of acts not constituting a crime may be admitted.
The danger stems from the degree of proof necessary to show the de-
fendant's acts amounted to a crime. In Ohio, the prosecution need not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's acts constituted another
crime.44  Rather, only "substantial" proof is required.45  However, the
courts have not attempted to define "substantial"; they only suggest that
the question is discretionary with the trial court under the facts and cir-
cumstances of the individual case. 6 In most cases, testimony by an eye
witness to defendant's criminal acts is sufficient." Some Ohio courts,
however, go even further, permitting a defendant's prior acts to be shown
by evidence of police investigations48 or police or private suspicions, often
not based on direct observation.4
A standard of proof less than that of "reasonable doubt" does not
provide a sufficient degree of certainty in ascertaining whether the al-
leged other crime occurred, or defendant's connection therewith. Cer-
41. 131 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
42. Id. at 669. (Emphasis added.)
43. See note 47 infra.
44. Scott v. State, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 N.E. 19 (1923), overruling, Baxter v. State, 91
Ohio St. 167, 110 N.E. 456 (1914), which required the "same degree of proof required in
all criminal cases."
45. Scott v. State, supra note 44, at 476, 141 N.E. at 19; State v. Robert, 131 N.E.2d 665
(Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
46. Other jurisdictions are not in accord on this problem. State v. Bryant, 97 Minn. 8, 105
N.W. 974 (1905) (excluding evidence of prior arrest). Contra, State v. Carroll, 188 S.W.2d
22 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1945). California has admitted evidence of police observations in People
v. Hozakis, 102 Cal. App. 2d 662, 228 P.2d 58 (1951). See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law 5
690 (1961).
47. E.g., People v. Knight, 62 Cal. App. 143, 216 Pac. 96 (1923).
48. State v. Haines, 112 Ohio App. 487, 176 N.E.2d 446 (1960), appeal dismissed, 171
Ohio St. 198, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 904 (1960) (pick-pocketing
prosecution where evidence of a prior police investigation admitted).
49. State v. Shively, 172 Ohio St. 128, 174 N.E.2d 104 (1961). Here defendant was
charged with sodomy. A police chief was allowed to testify that his department received
other complaints concerning defendant's conduct. Also, defendant's pastor was allowed to
testify that defendant "jousled'" another boy's hair and "ran his hand" down the boy's back.
Other courts have not been as liberal. In State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365
(1948), involving a murder prosecution, testimony that defendant "went with a revolver
and used profane language and threatened to kill," held error because it merely showed de-
fendant to be a man of temper. In murder prosecutions evidence of a prior shooting in self-
defense is inadmissible. State v. Whigham, 60 Ohio App. 181, 20 N.E.2d 257 (1938).
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tainly, acts not constituting a crime have doubtful relevance in-proving an
element of the crime charged. Moreover, evidence of less than a con-
viction seems to darken the already dim probative value of other-crimes
evidence.
Instructions Under Section 2945.59
At common law, the trial court was under a duty to instruct the jury
on the limited purpose of other-crimes evidence. Although section
2945.59 of the Ohio Revised Code is said to be merely declaratory of
common law,50 it has been held that the trial court'is under no duty to
give instructions as to the limited purpose of criminal history unless there
is a specific request to do so by the defendant.5 Thus, the jury may, in
the absence of such instruction, consider the evidence for any purpose.
However, trial courts generally give instructions in the absence of a spe-
cific request by the defendant. This attempt to cure or mitigate tacitly
admits the presence of the prejudicial effect of other-crimes evidence.
But, whatever the case, courts and legal writers express doubt as to the
effectiveness. of such curative instructions. 2
Other-Crimes Evidence to Prove Intent
In a trial for a crime in which felonious intent must be proved, other-
crimes evidence is admitted to show the purpose or mental state of the de-
fendant in committing the crime charged. Admission is based on "proba-
bility"; that is, lack of guilty knowledge or possibility of accident may
explain the crime for which the accused is presently being tried, but the
recurrence of similar other crimes tends to lessen the probability that the
crime charged was committed without guilty knowledge or by accident.
Therefore, since admission is based on "probability," the other crimes
must be similar in nature to the crime charged in order to have probative
value.
Other-crimes evidence showing intent is generally admitted in two
types of cases. First, it is held admissible in cases in which the defendant
places the element of intent in issue by pleading accident or mistake.5"
Second, it is held admissible in cases in which proof of the crime charged
in and of itself permits no inference of felonious intent. Thus, in prosecu-
50. Clyne v. State, 123 Ohio St. 234, 172 N.E. 767 (1931), appeal dismissed, 283 U.S.
810 (1932).
51. State v. Pope, 171 Ohio St. 438, 172 N.E.2d 9 (1961); State v. Hollos, 76 Ohio App.
521, 65 N.E.2d 144 (1944).
52. See Justice Jackson's remarks in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1959);
Note, 54 CoLum. L REv. 946, 965-67 (1954).
53. State v. Ensmunger, 149 Ohio St. 289, 77 N.E.2d 79 (1948) (practicing medicine
without a license); State v. Berkman, 79 Ohio App. 432, 74 N.E.2d 411 (1944) (running
a gambling room).
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tions for possession or receipt of stolen goods,54 forgery,55 false represen-
tation,56 soliciting bribes," uttering counterfeit money, 8 and fraudulent
sale of chattels59 in which the state must prove "guilty knowledge,"
evidence of prior similar crimes is admissible. In the above types of
cases, other-crimes evidence is legitimately relevant to show intent.
However, in trials for crimes where proof of the crime charged in
and of itself necessarily establishes felonious intent, evidence of other
crimes is not properly admissible. In such cases, the only possible effect
of criminal history evidence is to prejudice the defendant by showing his
criminal disposition.
In deciding whether other-crimes evidence is properly relevant to
show intent, Ohio courts generally give the nature of the crime charged
full consideration as a determinative factor. For example, in prosecutions
for murder," abortion,6' and unlawful breaking and entering,6 2 it has
been held that other-crimes evidence is properly excluded in that the na-
ture of the crime charged in and of itself permits an inference of intent.
Other-Crimes Evidence to Prove Motive
Motive, which has generally been defined as the inducing force which
causes a person to commit a crime,6" need not be proved to establish guilt.
It is usually brought into issue, however, as an aid in establishing intent.
Unlike using other-crimes evidence to show intent, it is not necessary for
the other crime to be of the same nature as the crime charged, on the
theory that "probability" is not a factor.
Other-crimes evidence is commonly used to show motive where the
defendant commits the crime charged in an attempt to escape arrest, or
prevent discovery of a former crime.64 For example, in State v. Ross,65
54. State v. Pope, 171 Ohio St. 438, 172 N.E.2d 9 (1961). Some text authorities and
courts would require the property to be of the same type, stolen from the same owner, or
stolen by the same thief. RIcHARDsON, EVIDENCE § 181 (8th ed. 1955). Ohio courts have
not held these requirements to be absolute, suggesting that they are merely guidelines.
55. Richards v. State, 43 Ohio App. 212, 183 N.E. 36 (1932).
56. Coblentz v. State, 84 Ohio St. 235, 95 N.E. 768 (1911).
57. State v. Davis, 90 Ohio St. 100, 106 N.E. 770 (1914).
58. Reed v. State, 15 Ohio 217 (1846).
59. State v. Roberts, 131 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
60. State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948). Contra, Clyne v. State, 123
Ohio St. 234, 174 N.E. 767 (1931), appeal dismissed, 283 U.S. 810 (1932).
61. State v. Brown, 137 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) (evidence admitted on other
grounds).
62. State v. Zidak, 91 Ohio App. 464, 108 N.E.2d 834 (1951) (evidence admitted on other
grounds).
63. BLACK, LAw DICTIoNARY 1164 (4th ed. 1951).
64. Shelton v. State, 106 Ohio St. 243, 140 N.E. 153 (1922) (murder prosecution where
evidence admitted showing defendant a fugitive from justice); State v. White, 116 Ohio App.
522, 189 N.E.2d 160 (1962) (child stealing prosecution where evidence of prior sex acts
admitted).
65. 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E.2d 77 (1952).
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the defendant was tried for fatally shooting a police officer; the court al-
lowed evidence which showed the defendant had committed prior rob-
beries on the theory that defendant's motive in shooting the police officer
was to prevent discovery of those robberies. In such a case, the evidence
is necessary to establish motive and is therefore properly admitted.
Some courts, however, have admitted other-crimes evidence under the
guise of motive where the nature of the crime charged in and of itself
permits a dear inference of the defendant's motive."u Thus, in trials
for sex crimes, motive may be inferred from evidence establishing the
occurrence of the crime charged and the defendant's connection there-
with. 7 In this type of case, other-crimes evidence is only relevant to
show defendant's criminal disposition.
Other-Crimes Evidence to Prove Plan or Scheme
Evidence establishing a defendant's plan or scheme in committing a
series of crimes is not necessary to establish the crime charged. Showing
a plan or scheme, however, is an aid in identifying defendant with the
crime charged. " Evidence of other crimes committed by defendant in
carrying out his plan is, therefore, relevant to "earmark" him as the
perpetrator of the crime charged. Accordingly, the other crimes must be
similar in nature to the crime charged and committed in a particular man-
ner or by novel means.
In Whiteman v. State,69 the supreme court considered the question of
admitting evidence of other crimes to show a plan or scheme in commit-
ting the crime charged. There, the defendants had committed a series of
robberies in a single neighborhood, all within a three week period. In
each instance, the defendants had used a police car in addition to bus
driver uniforms to deceive their victims. At trial for one of the robberies,
the court admitted testimony from the other victims showing the similar
aspects of the robberies. In upholding this admission, the court established
three requirements for using other-crimes evidence to show plan or
scheme in committing the crime charged. They are: (1) that all the
crimes within the scheme must be committed within a short period of
time;7" (2) that they must be committed within the same locality;7 and
66. State v. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403, 44 Pac. 889 (1896).
67. See notes 79, 80 infra and accompanying text.
68. Where defendant pleads alibi, courts have expressly declared other-crimes evidence ad-
missible to show "identity." State v. Brown, 137 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); State v.
Stamper, 85 N.E.2d 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953).
69. 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928).
70. The supreme court has never defined the period of time within which the crime must
occur. However, a court of appeals has held "remoteness" to be comparative, thereby allowing
the trial courts reasonable latitude in determining the question of remoteness. State v. Hop-
kins, 117 Ohio App. 48, 189 NXE.2d 636 (1962).
71. Although the supreme court has never defined the limits of "locality," two courts of
1964]
WESTE3RN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
(3) that they must be committed pursuant to a particular method. In
the similar case of State v. Martin,7" another court upheld the admission
of testimony showing that defendant had committed other robberies ac-
cording to a plan.
In spite of the unique plans used by defendants in the Whiteman and
Martin cases, it can still be argued that the evidence was relevant purely
to show a propensity to commit crime, and not as an aid in proving identity.
In Whiteman, both the victim of the robbery and his companion identi-
fied the defendants in direct testimony. In Martin, the defendant's part-
ner in the charged robbery, testifying for the state, named defendant as
participating in that crime. The state established a prima facie case in
both instances on the basis of this testimony. Therefore, it is doubtful
whether other-crimes evidence has any value other than to display the
defendant's propensity to commit crime in cases where the prosecution
has ample evidence of another type, such as direct testimony from the
victim, to prove the defendant committed the crime charged.
Other-Crimes Evidence in Sex Crimes
As noted previously, the question of whether other-crimes evidence is
relevant as substantive proof of the crime charged must be determined in
light of: (1) the weight of other-crimes evidence in establishing the oc-
currence of the other-crime(s) and defendant's connection therewith,
(2) the nature of the crime charged, and (3) the other types of evidence
available to the prosecution. All bear directly on the question of whether
other-crimes evidence is relevant as substantive proof of the crimes
charged, or relevant only to show disposition. Ohio courts give little or
no consideration to these factors in cases involving sex offenders. In ad-
dition, the courts go far beyond a literal interpretation of section 2945.59
of the Ohio Revised Code, and in some instances they completely disre-
gard that section's specific exceptions in an effort to admit other-crimes
evidence in sex cases.
Ohio is among the majority73 of American jurisdictions which permit
the prosecution to introduce evidence of other sex crimes committed by
the defendant upon the prosecuting witness. However, the courts do not
attempt to justify admission under any of the recognized statutory excep-
tions. Rather, in prosecutions for the so-called "consent" sex crimes,74 they
appeal have excluded evidence of prior crimes committed in other cities. State v. Hollos,
76 Ohio App. 521, 65 N.E.2d 144 (1944); State v. Cocco, 73 Ohio App. 182, 55 N.E.2d
430 (1943).
72. 191 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
73. State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 P.2d 731 (1951) (prior acts with persons other
than prosecutrix excluded); State v. Haney, 219 Minn. 518, 18 N.W.2d 315 (1945); Wilson
v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 337, 96 S.W.2d 1026 (1936) (admitted upon condition that
the trial court instruct that evidence was limited to identify or to corroborate).
74. Adultery, fornication, incest, seduction, and statutory rape are among the "consent"
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admit other-crimes evidence for the specific purpose of showing the de-
fendant's criminal disposition toward the prosecuting witness. " The
courts take this position because they look upon prior criminal conduct
between the prosecuting witness and the defendant as having a high prob-
ability of continuing up to and beyond the time of the commission of the
crime charged.
Ohio courts, however, do not stop with admitting evidence of other
sex crimes committed with the prosecuting witness; rather, they go be-
yond the majority position by admitting evidence of other sex crimes com-
mitted with persons other than the prosecuting witness. Various reasons
are given to justify this position. For example, in a prosecution for in-
cest with the defendant's daughter, one court upheld evidence of similar
crimes committed by the defendant with his other daughter. 6 The court
based its decision on the fact that the same relationship existed between
the defendant and the second daughter as existed with the prosecuting wit-
ness. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld other-crimes evi-
dence admitted to "identify" the defendant with the crime charged, where
the defendant was charged with sodomy committed upon a six year old
child.7" Although the young victim identified the defendant as the per-
petrator of the crime charged, testimony of six other children upon whom
defendant had committed similar crimes was also admitted to identify
the defendant. The court pointed out that "identity" in cases involving
sex crimes is broader than physical characteristics; it also includes per-
verted character on the theory that sex deviates usually follow a particular
pattern." This liberal attitude in sustaining admission of other-crimes
evidence in prosecutions for sex crimes goes far beyond the literal mean-
ing of "identity."
Still other courts attempt to use motive as a basis for admission of
other-sex-crimes evidence, declaring that such evidence is relevant to "rea-
sonably disclose defendant's purpose" in committing the crime charged.79
The validity of this position is, to say the least, doubtful, for in sex crimes
the defendant's motive in committing the crime charged is obvious and
can be readily inferred from proof of the crime charged in and of itself8
crimes. State v. Reineke, 89 Ohio St. 390, 100 N.E. 52 (1914) (incest prosecution where
evidence of subsequent acts with prosecutrix admitted).
75. Boyd v. State, 81 Ohio St. 239, 90 N.E. 355 (1909) (statutory rape and evidence of
prior acts with prosecutrix admitted).
76. State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio App. 318, 81 N.E.2d 546 (1948).
77. Barnett v. State, 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922).
78. Ibid.
79. State v. Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 268, 158 N.E.2d 406 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. Giles, 83 Ohio App. 39, 82 N.E.2d 132 (1948); State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio
App. 318, 81 N.E.2d 346 (1948).
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Using motive as a basis only conceals the true purpose of the evidence,
which is to display before the jury the defendant's propensity to commit
this type of crime. In spite of the various reasons given by the courts,
language describing other-crimes evidence as showing "moral degener-
acy" 81 or "perverted emotion"82 indicates that the evidence is admitted
for the sole purpose of showing criminal disposition.
At the present time, only Kansas and California8 have expressly held
evidence of prior sex crimes with persons other than the prosecuting witness
to be admissible for the sole purpose of showing propensity to commit
crime. But for all practical purposes, Ohio has joined this minority posi-
tion, In a recent case involving a prosecution for sodomy, the trial
court admitted testimony tending to show that defendant had committed
similar crimes with other boys.84 After all the evidence was presented,
the court gave the following charge to the jury:
[T] his evidence was allowed for whatever effect you determine it might
have on the alleged moral disposition and perversity of the defendant it
being a theory of the law that a person who has indulged in similar
conduct at other times to that alleged in the indictment is more likely
to have that type of moral disposition to commit the act alleged than
one who has not indulged in such acts.85
In upholding this charge, the Ohio Supreme Court has in effect sanctioned
the admission of other-crimes evidence for the sole purpose of showing
criminal disposition.
The primary reason for the liberal policy in this area is what jurists
believe to be fact - recidivism. 6  Courts believe that sex offenders are
more likely to "repeat" their crimes than are other criminals. However,
this position is questionable. Statistics show that sex offenders are no
more prone to "repeat" their crimes than other criminals.8 7 Although
sociologists and criminologists differ on this point, the majority of them
indicate that recidivism is less among sex offenders.88 In any event, the
80. State v. King, 276 Il. 138, 114 N.E. 601 (1916) (evidence not competent to show
motive, when inferred from the act); State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 P.2d 731 (1951)
(motive inferred from the act).
81. State v. Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 268, 158 N.E.2d 406 (1958).
82. State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio App. 318, 81 N.E.2d 546 (1948).
83. People v. Herman, 97 Cal. App. 2d 272, 217 P.2d 440 (1950); People v. Whiting, 173
Kan. 711, 252 P.2d 884 (1953).
84. State v. Shively, 172 Ohio St. 128, 174 N.E.2d 104 (1961).
85. Id. at 131, 174 N.E.2d at 106. (Emphasis added.)
86. Commonwealth v. Bowldon, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 116 A.2d 867 (1955).
87. Slough & Schwinn, The Sexual Psychopath, 19 U. KAN. CITY L REv. 131, 137 (1951),
citing a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on twenty-five types of crimes in which
sex offenders placed seventeenth in a listing measuring recidivism.
88. Compare Commonwealth v. Bowldon, 179 Pa. Super 328, 341-44, 116 A.2d 867, 873-
74 (1955) (discussing studies on this subject), with Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy
-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952) (discussing conflicting authorities).
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